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Anthony Reid and Shiraishi Saya
The interaction of peasant movements with national elite politics 
has been a specter equally alarming to colonial and some independent 
governments in Asia. In Netherlands India colonial policy put a high 
priority on sealing the two phenomena off from each other, particularly 
after the communist-inspired revolts of 1926-27. To a remarkable d e ­
gree the Dutch appeared to have succeeded, after 1927, in limiting 
national politics to the relatively small urban elite of Indonesia, 
and creating an impression of static rust en orde in the countryside.
To judge from the available record, the Indonesian peasantry might 
appear to have been quiescent from the late 1920s until 1945. Rural 
areas were certainly directly involved in the revolution of 1945-50, 
yet we still know very little about the manner in which peasant move­
ments and preoccupations related to the national issues then being 
fought out. Part of our difficulty here undoubtedly lies in the pau­
city of information about peasant reactions to the Japanese occupation.
The transition from Dutch to Japanese rule in 1942 represented 
for rural people a discontinuity at least as dramatic as the Proclama­
tion of Independence three and a half years later. The change provided 
the ultimate test of how successful the post-1927 Dutch policies of 
stabilization, compartmentalization, and reinvigorating the constraints 
of traditional adat had been. Would the Indonesian villager demand 
changes from the new regime, and with what degree of insistence or 
violence? Unfortunately, the almost total absence of information has 
so far tended to dissuade scholars even from probing this issue. 
Scholarly attention has necessarily been focused on the celebrated 
events of 1945 rather than 1942, and on Java rather than the Outer 
Islands, where a greater degree of violence accompanies the Japanese 
takeover.1
The paucity of material on developments during the early part of 
the Japanese administration is nowhere more acute than for Sumatra, 
recently portrayed as "still shrouded in a good deal of mystery."1 2 
The major source of light on the subject, apart from the growing numb'er
1. Some evidence for this turbulence in the Outer Islands appears in Anthony Reid, 
"The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942," 
Journal of Asian Studies (JAS), XXXV/1 (November 1975), pp. 49-62; Republik Indo­
nesia. Propinsi Sumatera Selatan (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, n.d.), pp. 
32-33; Republik Indonesia. Propinsi Sulawesi (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 
n.d.), pp. 208-9; and C. van Heekeren, Rode Zon boven Borneo. West Borneo 1942 
(The Hague: Bakker/Daamen, 1968), pp. 136-40.
2. H. J. Benda, J. K. Irikura, and K. Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration 
in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), 
p. vi.
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of personal Japanese memoirs, is the collection of papers taken back 
to Tokyo by Marquis Tokugawa in 1943, and now available for consulta­
tion in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency archives, though without an 
adequate index.
The document translated here forms part of that collection, and 
we are grateful to the Self-Defense Agency for permission to translate 
it, and particularly to Mr. Imaoka, the former archivist, for his help 
in locating it. The document is a report compiled by someone in the 
police division of the Twenty-fifth Army Military Administration Head­
quarters in Singapore, in about November 1942. The Twenty-fifth Army 
was at that time responsible for the administration of both Sumatra and 
Malaya, and a separate report on the security situation in Malaya was 
compiled at the same time and attached to this report on Sumatra. Each 
report concentrates on the local problem believed to be most serious-- 
the Malayan Communist party in Malaya and the opposition to pre-war 
officials and rajas in Sumatra. Although the larger questions of 
political policy must have been beyond his competence, in this Sumatra 
report the author makes clear that a major reconsideration of policy 
was in fact required.
In contrast to the Malaya report, no specifically anti-Japanese 
sentiment is given any prominence in the discussion of Sumatra trans­
lated here. The uncompromising hostility of the Acehnese ulama Teungku 
Abdul Djalil is scarcely mentioned, partly because it climaxed just 
after the period covered by this survey, but also perhaps because an 
analysis of it would have been more difficult. Abdul Djalil had 
likened the Japanese to pigs and to the demonic Yajuj and Majuj (Gog 
and Magog) who bring destruction at the end of the world. It was sim­
plest to write him off as a crazy fanatic (see note 4 below).
The disturbances described here do, however, derive from a common 
basic uncertainty and reorientation which accompanied the change of 
regime. Those who had grievances saw a chance to right them; those 
who lacked power or position saw an opportunity to obtain them. Many 
nationalist politicians of course believed that the Japanese would 
bring them closer to independence or at least a share in power. For 
peasants, however, the central issues were always taxation and land.
It was primarily because of their role in levying taxes and disposing 
of land that ruling elites had earned popular hostility in particular 
areas. The propaganda of the Japanese and their Indonesian supporters 
led many to believe that taxation would be abolished, land returned to 
its "rightful" owners, and power taken from the hands of the aristo­
cratic elite who had ruled under the Dutch system.
The emphasis placed in this report on Indonesian criticism of the 
"sultan and raja systems" suggests that the situation in East Sumatra 
occupied most of the author's attention. It may have been the Arnhemia 
(Pancur Batu) affair (see below pp. 129ff.) which gave rise to the whole 
report and dominated its conclusions. Behind the Arnhemia affair and 
all the other four East Sumatran incidents described was the avon move­
ment among Karo Batak farmers of the d usun, or upper districts of the 
Deli and Langkat sultanates. Although there is, to the best of my 
knowledge, no mention of this movement in any Dutch source, its origins 
in the land problems of the late 1930s can be briefly described.
The 1930 census showed 28,079 Karo in Langkat and 37,341 in Deli- 
Serdang, almost all of them farmers of the dusun areas. In Karo tradi­
tional law it had been the village (kuta) which had controlled the 
disposal of land and operated as an effectively autonomous unit of
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government. Kinship ties did bind the village for some purposes to its 
parent village (perbapaan). But in pre-colonial times only the trade 
passing down the East Sumatran rivers and the constant warfare in the 
area tied these villages into larger political units, of which the 
Malay states at the river-mouths were the most remote. The Dutch, how­
ever, came to acknowledge the primacy of Deli, Langkat and Serdang, and 
through a blend of intricate diplomacy and warfare forced the other 
Karo/Malay states into dependent relationships to one or another of 
these three. Dutch planters, moreover, utilized the domain principle 
claimed by the Malay rulers to lease vast tracts of land, in Karo as 
well as Malay areas. The royalties went not to the village but to the 
hierarchy of headmen, datuk and royal courts through which the Dutch 
administered the area. By the end of the Dutch era the autonomy of the 
Karo village was being rapidly undermined in favor of this predominant­
ly Malay hierarchy, which thus came often to be resented for ethnic as 
well as economic and political reasons.
In the early years of estate expansion there was in practice 
plenty of land for all. The tobacco estates were able to satisfy peas­
ant discontent by offering those in their area a so-called jaluran--a 
newly harvested tobacco field, fertile, well fertilized and prepared 
for planting--in a different place each year.
By the late 1930s, however, the system was breaking down under the 
pressure of rapidly increasing population in prosperous East Sumatra, 
and the growing impatience of the estates over the jaluran system.
Each year brought greater conflicts over the way jaluran were distrib­
uted, particularly in the more explosive Karo areas. The issues came 
to a head in 1938, aggravated by the publicity given a draft law to 
abolish jaluran altogether in favor of permanent subsistence blocks 
for farmers, in connection with the rewriting of estate concessions in 
terms of erfpaohten (long leases). The Medan press, the East Sumatran 
representative in the Volksraad (Soeangkoepon), and of course the n a ­
tionalist parties, all took up the various cases of grievance and 
"starvation" which then came to light. The police chased off those 
squatting on estate land and burned their huts. In May, 600 Karo peas­
ants marched from the dusun to demand a better deal from the sultan of 
Deli.3
It was in this climate, the following month, that ten Karo from 
the Arnhemia district sought advice from the Medan headquarters of the 
Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia (Gerindo, Indonesian People's Movement), the 
largest political party in East Sumatra and the one most active on the 
land question. They were advised to establish a purely farmers' organ­
ization in the dusun area. This took shape immediately in the Serikat 
Tani Indonesia (Setia, Indonesian Peasant League), led by Minta Karo- 
Karo as chairman and Kitei Karo-Karo as secretary. Branches were 
quickly established in various villages of the dusun, and such griev­
ances discussed as shortages of land, maldistribution of jaluran, the 
deterioration of Karo adat under outside influences, and the prohibi­
tion on peasants entering forests.
From September the government began to crack down on the movement 
through the sultanate hierarchy, forcing four penghulu (village heads) 
to resign from Setia, and dismissing others who failed to comply.
3. Kantoor voor de Volkslectuur, Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche 
Pers (Weltevreden, 1938), April 16, May 7, and July 2, 1938. Volksraad, Hande- 
lingen van het College van Gedelegeerde (1937-38), pp. 185-87, 204-5, and 215-18.
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Under this pressure Setia began to turn towards cooperative activity 
in marketing and farming. ** Although information on its activities in 
1940-41 is unfortunately not available, there is no doubt that it grad­
ually became transformed into the aron described in this report. Cap­
tain Inoue Tetsuro, the police chief responsible for crushing the aron, 
mentions that its leaders were Kitei Karo-Karo and Gumba Karo-Karo, 
both of whom had been briefly imprisoned in December 1938 when serving 
respectively as secretary and vice-president of Setia.4 5
The word aron (or aroan) is normally used among Karo Batak of the 
Deli dusun to designate a group of villagers who harvest collectively, 
moving through the fields of each member in turn. When the harvest is 
complete the same members are responsible for a dramatic entertainment 
{guro-guro aron) in which they compete with other groups for popular­
ity.6 The use of the term aron for the 1942 peasant movement reflects 
its primary concern with the "illegal" occupation and cultivation of 
land.
There is fortunately a little more information on the aron in the 
memoir of Captain Inoue, who had been acting in 1942 as both bunshuohd 
(assistant resident) of Deli/Serdang and police chief (keimubucho) for 
all East Sumatra. Although compiled some time after the events d e ­
scribed in our report, and conflicting with it in some minor factual 
respects, Inoue's memoir was clearly based partly on documents still 
in his possession, and sheds more light on the character of the aron. 
The most relevant section is the following:
[On August 6] I consulted the records on the aron. One of the Kenpe- 
tei [military police] records stated that during the disturbed time 
when the Japanese were landing in Sumatra one of the members of the 
’■Fujiyama [sie--Fujiwara] Kikan"7 told the people of Deli-hulu [Upper 
Deli], "when the Japanese come, the native chiefs will be thrown out, 
and you can own whatever land you like." But when the native chiefs 
kept power for month after month, and people had to obey the existing 
land laws, they became dissatisfied. Ambitious leaders of political 
parties worked up this dissatisfaction, distorted the rash promises 
of the Fujiyama-Kikan members as if these meant the Japanese Army's 
recognition of their demands, and instigated innocent people to cul­
tivate land illegally and become members of the aron Secret Society.
Then the dai-sonoho and chu-sonchd [datuk and perbapaan?] were fre­
quently attacked and robbed by them. If possible they tried to cut
4. "Politiek Verslag Sumatra's Oostkust" (hereafter "Politiek Verslag S.O.K."),
June, September, October, and December 1938, and March 1939, in mailrapporten 
(hereafter Mailr.) 776x/38, 1080x/38, 1217x/38, 222x/39 and 544x/39 respectively 
(Colonial Archive of the Interior Ministry, The Hague).
5. Inoue Tetsuro, Bapa Djanggut (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 1953), p. 55; "Politiek Verslag 
S.O.K.," December 1938, p. 10, Mailr. 222x/39.
6. Tengku Luckman Sinar, "The East Coast of Sumatra under the Japanese Heel," Berita 
Kajian Sumatra, 1/1 (1972), p. 33.
7. The Fujiwara-kikan was the Japanese fifth-column organization for Sumatra, under 
the command of Major Fujiwara Iwaichi. It dispatched several boatloads of Suma­
trans from the Malayan coast in January and February 1942 to prepare a sympa­
thetic reception for the Japanese invaders. The greatest success of this 
F-kikan, as it was known, was in sparking an anti-Dutch revolt in Aceh, but it 
also operated through the Gerindo party in East Sumatra. See Anthony Reid, "The 
Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites," pp. 52-58.
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down the chiefs and replace them. As a minimum they demanded more 
power against their chiefs.
The aron problem was created by the land problem. As long as 
the authorities maintain the existing one-sided land law which is 
based on a secret contract between the traditional aristocrats and 
the Dutch planters, the prospect of a return of public order in 
Deli-hulu is unlikely.
The fuku-bunshucho [controleur, district head] of Arnhemia re­
ported the following incidents:
June 3, 1942: The soncho8 of Sumba [Sembahe?] was killed.
June 5 The banana plantation of the soncho of Tangkahan was
seized.
June 8 The dai-sonch5 [perbapaan] of Gunung Mulia [Suka
Mulia?] was terrorized.
June 14 The soncho of Sibolangit and his wife were both
killed.
June 20 The house of the soncho of Lau Cih was plundered and
burned.9
June 25 The wife and children of the soncho of Namo Mungkul
[?] were killed.
June 27 Twenty pigs belonging to the sonchS of Puneng
[Penungkiren?] were stolen.
These specific incidents leave aside the question of illegal culti­
vation.
The report of the fuku-bunshucho went on to explain how people 
became members of the aron. Members had to bring a white chicken to 
the aron leader; its neck was wrung, and all drank the blood.10 * Un­
cooked rice was put in front of the new member, who had to swear his 
loyalty to the aron and promise secrecy. Then the new member had to 
hold grains of rice sideways in front of his mouth and throw them in.
There appear to be about 15,000 members of the aron.
Most people were very afraid of the aron, and did not dare open 
their doors after 6 p.m.11
Inoue put down the aron movement in draconian fashion, personally 
decapitating five leaders in a public display. Nevertheless, as an 
expert in tropical agriculture, he saw clearly the land hunger that 
was the basis of the problem. He relates that he urged four specific, 
concessions to the needs of the Karo farmers of upper Deli.
8. Soncho, the Japanese term for the head of an administrative village, was used 
in Sumatra for the head of a cluster of villages, usually having several thou­
sand inhabitants. In West Sumatra, a soncho was head of a nagari; in Aceh, he 
was the former uleebalang. In this area of East Sumatra the soncho appears to 
have referred sometimes to the pre-war perbapaan head, sometimes to the penghulu.
9. Lau Cih, a perbapaan-ship only a few kilometers north of Arnhemia, had been a 
principal center of Setia and the home of Kitei and Gumba Karo-Karo.
10. For the role of the sacrificial cock in (Toba) Batak ritual see Ph. 0. L. Tobing, 
The Structure of the Toba-Batak Belief in the High God (Amsterdam: van Campen, 
1956), pp. 158-67; and J. C. Vergouwen, The Social Organisation and Customary 
Law of the Toba-Batak of Northern Sumatra (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), p. 91.
11 . Inoue, Bapa Djanggut, pp. 54-55.
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1. Lease of 6,000 sq. meters [the size of the old, generous jaluran] 
of unirrigated land to each family..
2. Complete freedom for growing palawija (second crops of vegeta­
bles, and so forth).
3. Permission for new sawdh (irrigated rice land) wherever this 
could be done without disruption to the estates.
4. A tripling of the salt ration.12
The police report below, then, offers some insight into rural ten­
sions at the end of the Dutch regime. If this can be matched by simi­
lar material and field research for other areas of Indonesia, we will 
be closer to understanding what the Dutch and Japanese regimes meant 
for the Indonesian peasantry.
12. Ibid., p. 69.
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CONSIDERATION CONCERNING ORDER IN SUMATRA
Police Division, Military 
Administration Headquarters
Translated by Shiraishi Saya
I. General Overview of the Security Situation in Sumatra 
1. Evaluation of the security situation
Since the beginning of the Japanese military administration there 
has been no sign of an organized insurrectionary movement over the 
whole area of Sumatra such as that of the Malayan Communist party in 
Malaya. However, the rise of national consciousness has been apparent 
in the conflicts and hostilities among the population, the boycott of 
officials who have retained their pre-war positions, and the demand for 
the abolition of the sultan, raja and datu systems. As a result, con­
flicts between the people and the native officials have gradually in­
creased. In the Arnhemia district of the East Coast shu [Dutch resi­
dency] , the natives got up a riot which endecj with scores of dead and 
wounded. The prestige of the police collapsed, popular unrest was 
aggravated, and conditions became disturbed.
Special attention should be paid to the following points.
a. The disaffection of '’Indonesians'* dreaming of national libera­
tion and independence.1
b. Conflicts among the population, especially between the people 
and the sultans or rajas.
c. Opposition against the employment of former Dutch government 
officials.
d. Rumors and grievances over the decreased supply of everyday 
goods and inflation.
e. Dissatisfaction and disappointment with the military adminis­
tration, which has not fulfilled the expectations of the 
people.
1. The word "Indonesian" appears to be used in this report only to refer to urban- 
based nationalists, and for that reason is translated with quotation marks.
The promises of freedom from colonial oppression broadcast from Tokyo and 
Japanese-held Penang had ensured the Japanese conquerors an enthusiastic initial 
reception in Sumatra, as elsewhere in Indonesia. These hopes were rapidly 
crushed when the Japanese military regime imposed even more stringent controls 
on nationalist activity than had the Dutch regime, in conformity with a Sumatra 
military administration directive of April 1942: "All actions or statements
which may encourage native independence movements should be carefully avoided": 
Benda, Irikura and Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration, p. 172.
Within three months of the invasion (February-March 1942) the Indonesian national 
flag and anthem had been banned and all political parties dissolved.
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£. The anti-Japan and anti-military activities of Dutchmen re­
tained and employed by the Japanese military administration.2
These problems have been observed separately in scattered areas, 
however, and have offered no substantial threat to public order. They 
are future (not immediate) problems, and if industries are developed, 
goods are circulated and the living standard of the population is well 
established these problems will not become a consideration in the main­
tenance of order. Therefore it is time a policy toward the indigenous 
groups was established, police operations put on a proper basis, propa­
ganda energetically promoted, and efforts made to improve living stan­
dards. Such measures would make it easy for us to maintain public 
order.
2. Background information
i) In contrast to their counterparts in the Malay peninsula each 
ethnic group in Sumatra has organized itself apart from other groups; 
and their group consciousness is relatively strong. The colonial pol­
icy of heavily exploiting the population for their agricultural pro­
duce has provoked them to resent the Dutch and foreign nationals. 
Moreover, conflicts over land for cultivation have continually been 
observed, as is natural in an agrarian society.
ii) The present state of the communist and anti-Japanese movements
a. Communist movements
At present there is no threat of communist activities.
There is also no serious threat for the future unless elements of the 
Malayan Communist party come into Sumatra secretly to evade the 
strengthened measures to suppress them.3
b. Anti-Japanese movements
No serious anti-Japanese movements have been so far o b ­
served, although on November 10 some Muslims in Aceh shu started anti- 
Japanese activities which resulted in a great number of dead and
2. In East Sumatra the regime of the Japanese chokan (governor), retired General 
Nakashima, was particularly liberal towards Dutch personnel considered useful in 
the plantation sector and medical or technical functions. Even some civilian 
administrators, like Dr. Rees, the Assistant Resident of Langkat, were retained 
in an advisory capacity by the Japanese until the middle of 1943. This facili­
tated the establishment of anti-Japanese underground networks among Dutch and 
pro-Dutch officials, the most important of which was headed by 0. Treffers, the 
former Assistant Resident of Deli-Serdang. A. J. Piekaar, AtjSh en de oorlog 
met Japan (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 308-16; Oostkust van Sumatra Insti- 
tuut, Kroniek 1941-6 (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 17-19; Willem Brandt, De Gele Terreur 
(The Hague: van Hoeve, 1946), pp. 44-48.
3. Some prominent anti-Japanese leftists from Malaya did slip into Sumatra in 1942, 
including Tan Kah Kee, who lived quietly through the war in Brastagi. Tan Malaka 
also passed through Sumatra in June and July 1942, on his way incognito from 
Singapore to Java. In contrast to these men, who remained in hiding, the most 
prominent pre-war communists in Sumatra established good contacts with the Japa­
nese regime and worked with them in propaganda functions. These men, Xarim M.S., 
Nathar Zainuddin, and Nerus Ginting Suka, had returned from exile in Boven Digul 
in the early 1930s.
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wounded on both sides. ** Other than this, there are only a few activi­
ties among Indonesians and Chinese which might be judged to be anti- 
Japanese .
iii) The present state of conflict among the population
In Sumatra, there are such ethnic groups as Bataks, Acehnese 
and others each living in their own regions. These peoples, who re ­
sented Dutch oppression in the colonial era, are unsatisfied with the 
way the former Dutch government officials have remained in office under 
the Japanese occupation. In addition, trouble and conflicts have fre­
quently arisen among the population from their dissatisfaction and 
hostility towards the sultan and raja systems, the way agricultural 
land is distributed, and the taxation system. A most serious situa­
tion exists in the East Coast shu, where there have been repeated 
local disturbances.
Also among the Acehnese, who are the most violent and exclusive 
of all the inhabitants of Sumatra, violence and intimidation occur con­
stantly. This is the most serious state of affairs for the maintenance 
of public order under existing circumstances.
iv) The present state of protection of important facilities and
natural resources
At the beginning of the war, the Dutch army organized a demoli­
tion corps to destroy such important facilities as oil fields, refin­
eries, and storage tanks.4 5 Although the main figures in this corps
4. Although the Bayu Affair referred to here was probably the most serious cause 
for Japanese concern in Sumatra, unfortunately it receives no detailed attention 
in this report, which appears principally concerned with events up to the end of 
October 1942. The soul of resistance in Bayu (Lhokseumawe district in north 
Aceh) was Teungku Abdul Djalil, who had recently taken over the leadership of a 
famous Islamic school at Cot Plieng. He dissociated himself strongly from the 
enthusiastic welcome given to the Japanese by PUSA, the major Islamic organiza­
tion in Aceh, and was credited with the famous Acehnese phrase Geulet asee, 
geutrimong buy— Mthey have driven out the dogs (Dutch) and brought in the pigs 
(Japanese).11 From August 1942 there were reports that the Hikayat Perang Sabil, 
the classic Acehnese poem of summons to the holy war, was being read in the Bayu 
area, and that Abdul Djalil was identifying the Japanese as the enemies of Islam. 
Each demand by Acehnese or Japanese officials that Teungku Abdul Djalil appear 
before them for questioning only drove him to more resolute defiance. He went 
into religious seclusion (chalwat), while the two to three hundred pupils of his 
school prepared themselves for sacrifice through the constant recitation of reli­
gious formulae (ratib). As the pressure on him increased in early November,
Abdul Djalil turned the area around his mosque and school into a fortified sanc­
tuary forbidden to outsiders. The Japanese finally attacked with machine-guns 
and mortars on November 10 (some reports say 9). In a fierce battle the Acehnese 
defenders accounted for eighteen Japanese dead (according to Japanese figures) 
with their rencong (daggers), swords and spears, before the whole area was re­
duced to ashes and the defenders all killed or captured. The Acehnese dead ex­
ceeded a hundred. Piekaar, Atjjh, pp. 304-7; Mohammad Said, nTeror Djepang di 
Atjeh Nopember 1942,M Merdeka (Jakarta), July 3 and 4, 1972; Hamka, Kenang- 
kenangan hidup (2nd ed.; Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1966), pp. 202-11.
5. Dutch demolition work on the eve of the Japanese takeover was concentrated on de­
struction of the BPM refinery and installations at Pangkalan Brandan (East Suma­
tra) and the NKPM (later Stanvac) refinery at Sungei Gerong (Palembang).
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were arrested after the occupation, some members still remain in iso­
lated areas. In addition some intrigues have occurred on the part of 
natives to destroy important facilities for motives of private revenge. 
It is therefore highly necessary to make all efforts to protect impor­
tant facilities and natural resources.
v) Trends among ethnic groups
Among the local inhabitants it is necessary to pay special 
attention to the Bataks (1,230,000), who live in Tapanuli and the East 
Coast shu, the Minangkabau (2,000,000), and the Acehnese (960,000), to 
keep order in Sumatra. The Bataks constantly resort to violence b e ­
cause of their racial arrogance and aggressiveness. The Minangkabau 
and the Acehnese occupy important positions socially and economically 
and their aggressiveness frequently causes violence and intimidation, 
eventually resulting in the riot of November 10.6 The Acehnese are 
particularly exclusive, especially against the Chinese. Recently the 
Acehnese created problems in Aceh shu and the Bataks caused troubles 
in the East Coast shu. At the same time, however, the Bataks are rela­
tively well educated and the Acehnese are brave, clever, and ambitious. 
Therefore, if we guide them in the right direction by suitable propa­
ganda, they will cooperate with us willingly.
II. Details of the Disturbances
Since May* eleven disturbances to public order have occurred in 
Sumatra. In terms of their characteristics, they can be classified 
into three land distribution problems, three taxation problems and 
five cases of resentment and antipathy against the former Dutch govern­
ment officials who remained in office. Close investigation of the d e ­
tails of the above cases reveals the following causes for these inci­
dents. The majority of the inhabitants had expected that under the 
military administration their long-standing and earnest hopes for
(1) the independence of Indonesia, (2) liberation from the oppression 
of the former Netherlands Indies Government, and (3) the abolition of 
the sultan and raja systems, etc., would be immediately realized, and 
that they would be able to live in freedom. These popular expectations 
of liberation from the former regime became important and began to in­
fluence the people's behavior. Leaders quickly grasped the popular 
sentiment, and further aroused these feelings. On the other hand, the 
political machinery of the military administration utilized the former 
Dutch government officials and the sultan and raja systems in the 
general administration as a tentative policy.7 This widened the cleav­
age between popular expectations and the realities of the military 
administration. Moreover, the officials, sultans and rajas who parti­
cipated in the administration abused their authority and power contrary 
to people's expectations, either to show the Japanese army their loyal­
ty or merely in continuance of their old habits. Their actions often 
differed from what people expected and exceeded the intentions of the 
military government. The inhabitants have come to be extremely alien­
ated from the government and antagonistic towards it. This can clearly
6. See note 4.
7. Japanese policy towards the rajas is outlined in a document of July 1942 in 
Benda, Irikura and Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration, pp. 184-86. 
This envisages gradually persuading the rulers "voluntarily" to surrender effec­
tive powers in return for continued status and perquisites.
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be seen in the disturbances caused by the distribution of land. The 
people disregarded the instructions of the officials, sultans, and 
rajas and cultivated or opened up fields at will. To achieve what 
they wanted large numbers of them boldly resisted the attempts of offi­
cials to restrain the illegal cultivation. On the other hand the offi­
cials concerned resorted to force to try to disperse them and finally 
opened fire on them, gravely exacerbating the hostility of the people 
towards authority. In some cases which resulted in a number of dead 
and wounded, the situation got completely out of the authorities1 con­
trol. The incidents caused by taxation developed in a similar way.
The officials levied taxes which were not commensurate with living 
standards and tried to collect them in a forceful way. Out of fear of 
popular resistance they brought police escorts, and the shooting on 
their side provoked the people to riot. Most of the disturbances in 
Sumatra followed a similar pattern to this. We who are responsible 
for securing public order are painfully aware that these incidents 
have given us abundant grounds for a bitter reassessment of attitudes.
The attached table summarizes the development of the various dis­
turbances in Sumatra.
A Table Summarizing the Disturbances in 
Sumatra: May-October 1942
(1) May 10--Junjun [Junjung (Kerinci) or Sijunjung?] village, West Coast shu [West 
Sumatra]
Direct cause: Instigation by "Indonesians.1*
Summary: When three "Indonesian" teachers appealed to many villagers in front
of the village office to force their soncho to resign, a quarrel broke out among 
them, and six policemen came to stop it. Then three hundred villagers were in­
stigated to make a riot, which the Japanese army put down.
(2) June 1--Batukarang, about three kilometers west of Kabanjahe, East Coast shu.
Direct cause: A policeman's firing upon the crowd who were inveighing against
him.
Summary: At about 8 p.m., the inhabitants gathered to discuss a demand to the
raja urung about the problem of land distribution.8 The raja urung feared the 
consequences and asked the chief of Kabanjahe police station to settle the af­
fair. At around 11:30 p.m., four policemen hurried to the spot and tried to 
take Shiboron, the leader of the three hundred people who had assembled there, 
to the police station in order to investigate the affair, but because of the 
rage of the crowd they had to release him. The crowd still did not calm down/ 
but inveighed against the four policemen and the raja urung. At last one police­
man opened fire, which led to a fight. One policeman and three inhabitants died 
and seven inhabitants were wounded.
8. Batukarang was the largest of fifteen urung the Dutch had demarcated in the Karo 
plateau, each ruled indirectly through a hereditary raja urung. There were no 
foreign estates in the Karo plateau, and the land issue described here has a dif­
ferent origin from that in cases 3, 6, 10 and 11 below. Batukarang was one of 
the few areas of the Karo plateau irrigated in the 1920s, and one result was an 
unprecedented concentration of valuable land in the hands of some individuals, 
notably the raja urung in question. Much of this irrigated land changed hands 
during the 1942 aron affair. Another source of conflict was rivalry among a num­
ber of families for the raja urung-ship. This may have been the reason the raja 
urung mentioned here was later denounced to the Japanese, arrested, tortured and 
killed.
126
(3) June 18 and 20--Arnhemia, East Coast shu.9
Direct accuse: The inhabitants' resentment against the policemen who arrested
and executed those who were illegally cultivating public land.
iSummary: As a result of propaganda from the "Indonesians/' the [Karo] Batak in­
habitants ignored their raja and cultivated public land without obtaining any 
permission. When they were prevented from doing this and fourteen of them were 
arrested and executed, about two hundred inhabitants surrounded the police sta­
tion. On the 20th, three hundred people surrounded it again and made a distur­
bance. At last on July 26 they attacked the station. Scores of people were 
killed and wounded.
(4) August 18--Taeberu [Tayer Baruh?] village, Payakumbuh, West Coast shu.
Direct cause: The people were urged to pay a tax by the soncho, whom they did
not support.
Summary: A villager who had been discontented with the sonchd who had retained
his pre-war position committed an outrage against him when he was urged to pay a 
tax. Soon other villagers joined him. The arrival of policemen prevented the 
outbreak of a riot, but the situation is still threatening.
(5) August 26--Bandan [?] village, Palembang.
Direct cause: The sonchd put under arrest the son of a man who had not paid a
tax.
Summary: The man whose son the sonchd had arrested got so angry that he decided
to kill the sonchd. But at the soncho's conference he shot and injured the 
guncho [district officer] by mistake.
(6) September 1--Payatsumankuru [?] village, Tapanuli.
Direct cause: The warning shots of policemen to disperse the crowd.
Summary: Policemen went to the village to investigate the arms in the possession
of the inhabitants. The villagers resented the stringent investigation and 
assembled in a manner which created a dangerous situation. More policemen were 
called for and warning shots were fired, which made the crowd rebel. As a result 
six were shot dead and eight wounded.
(7) September 7--Ujung Bandar village, East Coast shu.10
Direct cause: The people suspected the native officials of harming them delib­
erately.
Summary: The people killed the sonchd on the grounds that the problem of agri­
cultural land caused them real hardship, because the Japanese administration 
utilized the former Dutch government officials.
(8) September 10--Lubuk Basung village, West Coast shu.
Direct cause: Former policemen of the Dutch administration instigated the people
9. Arnhemia, originally a Dutch estate town, was renamed Pancur Batu on March 10, 
1943. (Sumatra-Sinbun, March 11, 2603 [1943]). This affair, described in more 
detail below, is known in Indonesia as the Pancur Batu Affair.
10. Like cases 1, 3, 10, and 11, this incident was apparently a manifestation of 
the aron. Setia had been active in Ujung Bandar. In December 1938 the anak 
beru (deputy, or supporting, headman) of the village had been dismissed by the 
sultan for his membership in Setia, but the penghulu had nevertheless joined the 
movement, presumably to be dismissed in turn. "Politiek verslag S.O.K.," 
December 1938, Mailr. 222x/39.
127
to start trouble, and policemen opened fire.
Summary: When one of the inhabitants was imprisoned in the police station as
an offender against the transport regulation, many people gathered around the 
station. Ex-policemen and those who had belonged to the self-defense associa­
tion instigated them to use violence. Policemen fired warning shots to disperse 
the crowd.
(9) September 26--Puninjawa [?] village, Baturaja district, Palembang.
Direct cause: Policemen fired warning shots against a violent crowd.
Summary: The fuku-guncho [deputy district officer], the clerk, and the joyaku
[deputy headman] came to the village with two policemen to collect a tax there. 
Many villagers assembled and attacked them. When the policemen fired warning 
shots, the villagers became more upset. At last the policemen, fuku-gunch5 and 
soncho fired on them, and one villager was killed.
(10) October 3--Sembahe village, near Arnhemia, East Coast shu.
Direct cause: A fit of antipathy to the officials.
Summary: The acting soncho of Sembahe was killed by two aron members with their
parang [machetes] when he was extracting palm oil.
(11) October 15--Bulilir village, outside Medan, East Coast shu.
Direct cause: Policemen firing on a crowd.
Summary: Because the f,sultanM [of Langkat] accused the inhabitants of cutting
trees belonging to the soncho, a chief of police and thirteen other men went to 
the spot for investigation. A few hundred local inhabitants gathered around 
them. Because the people were taking a defiant attitude, the policemen fired 
warning shots, which caused a riot. Six of the inhabitants were shot dead and 
four were seriously wounded. The villagers thought that the cause of this inci­
dent was information sent secretly by the soncho and his wife, and they later 
killed them both, with one employee, and wounded a female servant.11
III. The Direct Causes of the Incidents
Though many factors contributed indirectly to the incidents, the 
most immediate and important cause is the antipathy of the people to ­
wards officials who retain positions they held under the Dutch regime. 
When these officials took administrative measures which conflicted 
with popular sentiments, or tried to oppress the people, the people 
affected joined together to defy the officials, which eventually re ­
sulted in open conflict between the officials and the people. This is 
the present state of affairs. In the cases cited we deplore the 
measures and the attitudes taken by the officials. In most of the 
above cases, believing there was a threat of mass violence, the offi­
cials immediately opened fire in order to disperse the crowd; yet this
11. The seven Karo villagers accused of this reprisal killing were tried five months 
later in the Medan high court, suggesting that the Japanese believed the law­
less interregnum was over. One of the accused was sentenced to death, four to 
life imprisonment, and the others to ten and seven years, respectively; Sumatra- 
Sinbun, March 11, 2603. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan hidup, pp. 197-98, and 246, 
describes the Bulilir Affair, like the Arnhemia (Pancur Batu) one, as a Karo 
revolt against the authority of the sultans. See also Tengku Luckman Sinar,
"The East Coast," p. 33.
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only angered the people and provoked them to riot. Thus, judging from 
past experience, shooting by officials, especially policemen, was the 
direct cause of the incidents. Together with the indirect causes al­
ready mentioned, this deepened the gulf between the officials and the 
people, as if the officials themselves provoked the disturbances. We 
must keep this point in mind in guiding the officials responsible for 
maintaining order.
IV. Some Views Concerning the Maintenance of Public Order
What has been described above is the pattern of disturbances which 
have so far appeared in Sumatra. There are still many ethnic problems 
among the population which have not yet appeared on the surface. 
Therefore any measure taken to secure public order should be based on 
a true understanding of the condition of the people, and punitive 
police actions should be based on the same understanding. Consequently 
the following points should be observed in the maintenance of public 
order.
1. It should be strongly emphasized that the Japanese authorities 
are responsible for handling incidents of this kind on the spot, espe­
cially in the field of police activity. It has been the case that 
incidents have been handled only by native officials and policemen as 
if there were no leadership on the side of the Japanese. This appears 
to have been the most significant factor in aggravating the situation.
2. It is necessary to give full instructions to native officials and 
policemen in how to handle disturbances. It is especially important to 
instruct and train the policemen when and how to use their firearms.
3. Police activity in response to these incidents should concentrate 
on seeking their fundamental causes and removing such causes. Once the 
appropriate measures are decided upon, they should be carried out thor­
oughly and without hesitation, so that the people really respect and 
obey the authorities.
4. As regards making use of the sultans and rajas in administration, 
they should be placed under the strict supervision of Japanese offi­
cials, to ensure they do not abuse their authority or take administra­
tive action which goes beyond the intentions of the military govern­
ment. It is important to make the inhabitants understand the real 
intentions of the Japanese military administration and to let this a d ­
ministration penetrate deeper through strict supervision and guidance 
of the sultans and rajas.
5. The following aspects of the native problem, which appear to have 
a great bearing on public order, should be investigated thoroughly to 
provide background material in resolving these problems.
a. The actual conditions of the inhabitants which lie behind peti­
tions or opposition movements against taxation.
b. The background and the real causes of petitions for the aboli­
tion of the sultan and raja systems.12
12. Here as elsewhere the writers appear to have East Sumatra in mind, although 
there were also attempts to oust the uleebalang in Aceh, the other Sumatran 
residency in which indirect rule was widespread. There appear to have been
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c. The actual state of conflict and jealousy among the population.
d. The conditions underlying the petitions from various religious 
groups.
e. The true nature of various groups and societies, and especial­
ly the degree of political consciousness shown by their leaders.
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF THE ARNHEMIA AFFAIR, 
EAST COAST OF SUMATRA
Purport
1. There have been conflicts between the natives and Dutch government 
officials in the Arnhemia district of the East Coast shu, arising from 
the land problem and alleged oppression. The [Karo] Batak people who 
had organized the aron society (corporate cultivation body) forced the 
inhabitants of the 321 villages near Arnhemia to enter the party in the 
hope of settling the land problem, and gradually they united into some­
thing like secret societies. Finally on July 26 and 27 they attacked 
the Arnhemia police station with the result that quite a number of 
people on both sides were killed and wounded. Even after that they 
have disturbed public order by killing soncho and resorting frequently 
to violence.
2. The East Coast shu police arrested nine aron leaders who bore re­
sponsibility for the affair, issued a proclamation, and assigned a 
keisatsu-buaho [superintendent of police] to the task of pacification 
and reestablishment of public order in cooperation with the bunshuoho 
[assistant-resident].* 13
I. Summary of the Arnhemia Affair
1. On July 20, 1942, on receipt of information that some members of 
the aron society beat up the soncho and wounded him in Goeriisan 
[Durian Sembilang?] village near the town of Arnhemia, several police­
men from the Arnhemia police station were sent out to investigate the 
facts. But because of the interference of many members of the aron 
society, the policemen were forced to return. On July 26, a party of 
thirty-five policemen were sent out to investigate the case of the
appeals to abolish the East Sumatran rulers from both wings of the nationalist 
movement— Gerindo, which had attempted to support the Japanese actively through 
the fifth-column "F movement"; and the moderate politicians who supported the 
"Comite Indonesia" organized by the Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra, Greater 
Indonesia Party) leader Sugondo. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan hidup, pp. 186 and 197; 
Dr. Amir's notes of June 14, 1946, Rijkinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, I.C., 
Doc. 005966.
13. In reality, Inoue Tetsuro was both the bunshuchS of Deli-Serdang at this time, 
and concurrently superintendent of the police for East Sumatra; Inoue, Bapa 
Djanggut, p. 52. Although in his memoir and elsewhere Inoue's police function 
is usually referred to as keimu-bucho rather than keisatsu-bucho, there is 
little doubt it is he to whom the report is referring here. Inoue was greatly 
trusted by the East Sumatra chokan, Nakashima, and his multiple roles appear to 
have been designed to give him a free hand to deal with the aron.
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beating up this sonchd as well as the subsequent aron interference, 
but they could get nowhere, because the aron party had destroyed the 
evidence.
2. On the way back to the central station, the police party met ten 
villagers carrying their parang, and confiscated the parang. But near 
the border of the village one villager, Nassa, came after the police 
party and tried to take back the parang. So the police arrested him 
and confined him in the Arnhemia police station.
3. The same day at 10 p.m., about five hundred aron members of the 
neighboring eighteen villages rushed to the Arnhemia police station to 
get Nassa back. The police, who had prior information of this attempt, 
placed fifty men on guard and tried in vain to calm the crowd down.
The mob forced its way into the station, and the policemen opened fire 
to drive them out again.14 The people then hid themselves around the 
station to await another chance to attack. Three hours later the 
Kenpeitai arrived on the scene and at last the crowd dispersed.
4. The number of dead and wounded in this affair are as follows
dead wounded total
local police 4 4
natives n 57 78
total 21 61 82
II. The Causes and the Development of the Affair (or Sedition)
1. Background
i) The East Coast shu, where kings [rajas] had governed, was gradu­
ally developed by many entrepreneurs since the establishment of Dutch 
administration in Sumatra in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Tobacco cultivation in particular flourished because the climate was 
suitable and the government gave the tobacco companies the right to 
use the land. The companies opened up vast areas and exported the har­
vest every year. Almost all government revenue was derived from the 
tax levied on use of the land. To produce tobacco of good quality the 
land must be left fallow for eight years after each [tobacco] crop. 
During the fallow period this land was distributed among the inhabi­
tants for their own cultivation, so that the idle people could obtain 
rich land without any hardship. For both officials and inhabitants in 
Arnhemia there was peace and order.
ii) But the number of natives who came from other places seeking a 
place to settle gradually increased until the amount of land for dis­
tribution became too small to distribute an equally adequate plot to 
all. In 1932, the government made an agreement with the companies to 
divide people into three different categories of entitlement.15
14. Tengku Luckman Sinar, "The East Coast," pp. 33-34, cites the Indonesian police 
chief in charge of this operation, Tengku Arifin Tobo, to the effect that the 
aron members were deliberately lured into an attack on the police post and then 
slaughtered in hundreds.
15. Competition to obtain the fertile jaluran was intensified not only by the steady 
influx of migrants to East Sumatra, but also by the drastic reduction in tobacco­
planting by the estates during the depression. A Dutch official, Klaassen, was
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6.000 sq. m. Those who had lived in their present location
since their forefathers' days.
4.000 sq. m. Those who had moved in from other places.
2.000 sq. m. Widows and orphans.
After some years the people of the second group presented petitions to the 
government saying that it was hard to maintain their livelihood on only 
four thousand square meters of land. Eventually they began to culti­
vate and occupy public land without any government permission, and com­
plained more and more about government police action. The aron soci­
ety, which was a legal, incorporated cultivators' association, backed 
up the people's demand and eventually transformed itself into an asso­
ciation whose primary purpose was to occupy land illegally.
iii) On the other hand the "Indonesians" had appealed to the people 
on a platform of reforming the government structure and obtaining n a ­
tional independence, using such slogans as "Give us the full right to 
vote." But the inhabitants were too indifferent to politics to listen 
to them. So the "Indonesians" took up the land problem, established 
the Committee of Indonesian Agricultural Land Economy and campaigned 
"give us the rich land," in order to win the inhabitants' support.16 
They did not miss the opportunity to get behind the aron society, and 
tried to work up the people against the government.
iv) The government, recognizing the danger of the situation, tight­
ened its control over the illegal occupation of public land and sen­
tenced the offenders to penal servitude or banishment. Under this 
pressure the aron society gradually transformed itself into an under­
ground movement resembling a secret society and forced the inhabitants 
to enter the society.
a. Those who refused to enter the society were beaten or killed.
b. The undertakings of the aron society were:
1. to keep the secrets of the aron;
2. to send any information obtained by members to the aron at 
once;
3. to fight bravely against officials when they came to a place 
where the members were working;
4. to sentence to death any members who betrayed secrets.
c. The secrets of the aron society were:
1. don't obey the orders of the soncho;
2. don't be afraid of policemen; when they come, never retreat 
but stay and fight with your swords.
empowered in 1932 to make for the first time a careful inventory of all those 
considered entitled to the full jaluran, which was traditionally 1 bahu (six 
thousand square meters). "Memorie van Overgave Sumatra's Oostkust, Gouverneur 
Ezerman, 1933," Mailr. 929/33, pp. 213-24.
16. By the "Indonesians" here the Gerindo party appears to be meant, the most vigor­
ous and radical nationalist party in East Sumatra. Unrest over the distribution 
of jaluran in the Karo-inhabited dusun of Deli reached its peak in May 1938 (see 
introduction). Gerindo took up the issue and established two branches in the 
dusun, at Arnhemia (June) and Sunggal (December 1938). It is not clear whether 
the committee referred to here in the report is the Comite Pencegah Kelaparan 
(Committee to Prevent Starvation) established by the fiery Mohammad Djoni in 
October 1939 after he had resigned from Gerindo, or perhaps Setia itself or one 
of its cooperative offshoots. "Politiek Verslag S.O.K.," October 1939, Mailr. 
1489*/39.
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In this way the aron society organized about two thousand inhabitants 
of 321 villages in Arnhemia district and established one large secret 
society.
v) This was the situation when the emperor's army occupied this 
area on March 12, 1942. Because of the activity of the propaganda 
organization of the emperor’s army, the people had expected that the 
officials of the former Dutch regime would lose their positions and 
power and that the people would be liberated from their oppression.17 
However, contrary to their expectations, the Japanese army made use of 
the former Dutch government officials and ordered local political asso­
ciations to be dissolved. The natives1 resentment against the offi­
cials was greatly aggravated and the situation became steadily worse.
2. The immediate cause of the incident
Because the soncho reported the illegal occupation of land and 
native policemen investigated the cases and arrested offenders, the 
people came to think that if they could eliminate the sonchS and the 
policemen they would be free to do what they wanted. They became very 
hostile towards soncho and policemen, and even began to offer resis­
tance. When an aron member was arrested, mob psychology, together with 
the instigation of the aron leaders, moved the people to recapture him. 
The policemen immediately fired in self-defense.
III. Counter-Measures
1. In the East Coast shu up to the present the police have concentrated 
their energy on investigating the organization and development of the 
aron society. After obtaining information they arrested Jacub Siregar18
17. Particularly influential in Sumatra were broadcasts from Radio Penang in the 
interval between the Japanese occupation of that town in December 1941 and 
their landings in Sumatra (South Sumatra late February; North Sumatra March 12). 
Many of the broadcasts were made by Sumatran nationalists living in Penang, who 
naturally emphasized their hopes of liberation. In the passage from Inoue's 
memoir translated in the introduction the role of the Fujiwara-kikan in arous­
ing Karo hopes was mentioned.
18. Mohammad Jacub Siregar (1912-c. 1960) was the son of a prominent Mandailing
businessman, publisher, and religious teacher, Sutan Martua Radja. He had a 
good Dutch education to MULO level in Binjai, East Sumatra, but always showed 
more interest in nationalist politics than in his father's commercial enter­
prises. He joined Sukarno's Partai Indonesia (Partindo, Indonesian Party) in 
1932, but rose to prominence in its successor Gerindo--as chairman first of its 
Binjei branch (1938), then for all East Sumatra (August 1939). He was particu­
larly concerned with the land issue and therefore enjoyed considerable influ­
ence with the Karo farmers organized in Setia. He had contacted the Japanese 
before the invasion and became the East Sumatran leader of the F-kikan, but his 
role in the aron affair remains obscure. Inoue, Bapa Djanggut, p. 59, cites a 
conversation he had with Siregar's Eurasian wife Khatijah, who pleaded for his 
release: "Of course Iwan [Jacub Siregar] is anti-sultanate, but he is wise
enough to know he cannot eliminate the authority of the sultans by reckless 
measures. Probably Iwan could be 'a father of the people of Upper Deli' but 
never a leader of the aron." Inoue's reply to this was that "we have never had 
conclusive evidence" about Siregar's involvement in the aron. He had been ar­
rested "on the basis of political necessity, based on the opinion of the 
shuchdkan [governor] himself."
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and eight other leaders of the aron society, who are presently under 
interrogation.19
2. The police division also issued the following proclamation, 
assigned a keisatsu-bucho to the task of pacification and guidance of 
the people in this area in cooperation with the bunshucho [of Deli- 
Serdangl, and increased the police force.
Proclamation
a. The aron, which is not based on tradition, is dissolved.
b. The following offices will be opened in the Arnhemia Branch of 
the Gunsei-bu [military administration]:
an Arnhemia Cultivators' Corporation Office 
an Arnhemia Agricultural Information Bureau.
c. After dissolution of this aron, its reorganization on a true 
basis will be permitted only if the permission of the bunshucho 
is obtained, and then under proper guidance of the office of 
the Arnhemia Cultivators’ Corporation.
d. The Arnhemia Agricultural Information Bureau will give general 
information on agricultural affairs.
e. Weapons which are unnecessary for cultivation should be surren­
dered to the police station at once.
Those who offend against the above regulations and band together ille­
gally to disturb the peace and order of society will be punished se­
verely.
IV. Conclusion
Though the original cause of this affair is rooted in former Dutch 
colonial policy, its direct cause lay in the misconduct of the police 
at an early stage of the affair. For this reason the situation became 
serious, and many natives were killed or wounded. Now the affair seems 
to be settled, but its harmful influence on the political consciousness 
of the natives and on the military administration has been so great 
that it will take great efforts and a long time to establish order.
The essential attitude of the responsible Japanese in dealing with such 
problems in the sphere of native affairs should be to grasp the general 
conditions, to develop the correct treatment for the problem, and to 
carry out what is once decided thoroughly and decisively.
19. Among the others arrested were Siregar's deputy in the pre-war Gerindo leader­
ship, Mohammad Saleh Oemar, and the leading Karo in Gerindo, Keras Surbakti.
